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VALUE

has been argued that such an approach
treats culture monolithically as singularly
shaping 'action by supplying ultimate ends
or values towards which action is directed'
(Swidler 19S(l: 273). This perspective is to
be compared with the concept of value in
classical economics of Adam Smith and
David Ricardo, where the concept concerns a set of relationships that obtain
within a system in the form of commodity
prices or exchange values. As Smith puts it:
'The value of any commodity ... is equal
to the quantity of labour which it enables
him to purchase or command. Labour ... is
the real meaSUIT of the exchangeable value
of all commodities' (Smith 197(l: 47).
Here, value is not an ultimate end towards
which action is directed, but rather the
effect of action involved in the work
required to extract objects of consumption
from nature.
Emile Durkheim criticized Smith's classical value theory explanation in terms of
labour input by arguing that it missed the
central dimension of the concept of value.
Value understood in terms of labour content appears as if it were something entirely
objective and impersonal. But Durkheim
argued that such a conception overlooks
the role of social opinion in determining
value, particularly in determining notions
of just value (Durkheim 1992). This same
critique, it should be noted, can be extended to neoclassical value theory in that it
also treats value as market price, though

Value generally refers to the amount of
money or other goods that must be paid to
obtain sonlething. There arc nonetheless a
number of very different value concepts,
and ill particular there is considerable difference between the ways in which economic socioloS'Y and orthodox economics
treat the concept of value. In contrast,
between l'conOlllic sociology and heterodox economics there arc significant commonalities regarding the treatment of the
concept of value. The differences date back
to the origins of sociology and classical
econonlics, and persist or have perhaps
become sharper between contemporary economic sociology and neoclassical economics. The commonalities between economic
socioloS'Y and heterodox economics have
emerged particularly since the 1~m()s.
III the history of sociology, value has
been treated as a property of entire social
systems, such as when it is associated with
the concept of culture by Max '\leber, one
of the early founders of sociology: The
concept of culture is a value concept.
Empirical reality becomes 'culture' to us
because and inso['lr as we rebte it to value
ideas (Weber 1949: 7(l).
On this view, our interest in reality is a
function of the values which culture
embodies, that is, our interest in the world
is a 'value-conditioned' one. Sometimes
termed the 'values approach to culture', it
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rather as determined by objectivc
objective and
impersonal f(lrCeS of supply and demand.
])urkheim's argumcnt
argument was framcd
framed primarily
in terms of thc
the v:tlue of labour, and while it
might be applicd
applied to the value of cOllSumer
and other typcs
types of goods, hc
he focuscd
focused on
arguing that the wagc
wage ratc
rate dcpends
depends upon
social standards regarding thc
the minimum
resources needed to sustain to survival, that
these standards werc
were set by public opinion,
and that they changed from period to period. However, Smith, David Ric:trdo and
even more strongly Karl Marx each held in
v:trying degrees similar views regarding the
social determination of the wage. And since
for each of them the value of other commodities depended upon the value of
labour, this implies that their values also
possessed a social component.
Durkheim's critique, however, is more
successful in regard to the neoclassical view
of the wage :ts determined by the marginal
productivity of labour in production and in
regard to the neoclassical view of price in
general as market-determined. The marginal productivity of labour is a schedule of
outputs made possible by incremental
increases in labour input. Its level reflects
the quantity of capital employed by labour,
where both labour input and the capital
employed are desCl;bed in natural units:
hours of labour and a certain quantity of
machines and equipment. While one might
say that social standards and public opinion
implicitly underlie these values, rarely do
these considerations enter into standard
analysis. Much the same can be s:tid about
the explanation of price in general in neoclassical economics. Consumers play an
important role in determining market price,
but consumer preferences are taken as
given and unchanging (Stigler and Uecker
1977), so that their social determinants may
be disregarded. Even more strongly,
revealed preference price theory (Samuelson 194H), which most mainstream economists now take as the standard explanation
of choice, makes the very content of pre-
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fercnccs irrdcv;\IJ(
ferences
irrdev;\IJ( to consulller choice.
More gcnerally.
Morc
generally. thc
the fi.lrInalist
fi.lrI11alist character of
nlllch rcccnt
recent l'cononnn
l'cononlln rcinf()rces
reinf()rces the
notion that valuc
value as pricc
price lacks any social
whatsoever.
characteristics whatsol'vLT.
charactcristics
In contrast, hetcrodox
heterodox traditions in economics, particularly AlIlcriclI]
AlIlericlI] institutional
econonllcs and soci:11 economics, hold
views of value rellliniscent of Weber's view
that value is a property of entire social systellls and I )urkhcim's
)urkheim's conception of market
values as socially influenced. American
valucs
institutional economists Thorstein Veblen,
John C01l1mons, John Maurice Clark and
others 1l1:1ke central institutiollS seen
seell as
'settled habits of thought com
common
mOIl to the
generality of 1l1en' (V
(Veblen
cblen 1919: 239).
Social economics, with origins in Simonde
de Sis1l1ondi, Karl Marx, Leon Wah'as,
Joseph Schum peter, John Hobson and
John Maurice Clark, see the social economy :1S encompassing the market economy,
so that social values and worldviews
penlle:tte m:trkets and underlie consumpperInc:tte
tion, production and distribution. Other
heterodox approaches, such as Marxist
economics, feminist economics, some ecological economics approaches :tnd
and postKeynesian economics, :tIT similarly holistic,
oriented, critical of the natn:tthistorically orientcd,
uralism and positivislll in economics, :tnd
ur:tIism
reject the atomistic individualism of neoclassical economics. The last is a key point
of tangency between heterodox economics
:tnd economic sociology and :ta key difference between orthodox economics and
economic sociology. Just as Georg Simmel,
in his important
il1lportant early study The Philosophy
(!f MOlle), (197H), identified related types of
individuals (such as the spendthrift and the
miser) according to their linked positions in
:tn
an economic system governed by money,
radical and Marxist economists see individuals :ts socially connected through their
membership in cbsses :tnd
and social groups
that inter:tct within systems
systel1ls of power, while
feminist economists see gender relationships in the economy as constitutive of
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individll;lls' economic roles and economic
prospects.
Interestingly, economic sociology enjoyed
thc 1')ROs, a period in which
a revival in the
hcterodox eCOllOlllics
CCOllOlllics was also undergoing
heterodox
considerable development.
developmcnt. While crossover
croSSOVl'r
cOlISidcrablc
relationships betwecn the two have been
noncthcless appear to
limitcd, thcy havc nonetheless
have each f()llowed certain parallel pathbc seen
scen to derive from a
ways tlLlt lIIay be
sharcd critiquc of the assumptions of neoncoshared
intl'restclassical economics. Even lIIore interestcconomic sociology and heterodox
ingly, economic
economics appear to share broad outlines of
;IS socially embedded
embcdded
a view of individuals ;IS
III Karl Polanyi, and of individuals and
society as mutually influencing. Thus,
p;lrallel to economic
cconomic sociologist Mark
Granovctter's influcntial characterization
of individuals' embedded ness in terms of
undersocialized nor overbeing ncithcr undcrsocialized
socialized (Granovetter 19R5), there is critical rcalism, a rccent heterodox rcsearch
programlllc combining
cOlllbining a number of differprogrammc
ent hcterodox approachcs, that employs a
structure-agent conception of society in
which individuals both influence and are
influenccd by social structurcs (Lawson
1997), and also a renewed interest in the
evolutiolJ:lry thcllles
thcmes of Veblenian institutional economics, that clllphasizes
cmphasizes upward
and downward causation operating between
individuals and institutions (Hodgson 20(4).
The 19f1Os also signal the beginnings of
changc in mainstream economics, with the
emergence of a collection of new research
programmcs
programmes that bear limited rescmblance
to neoclassical economics and each other.
These new research progr:lIlll11es have
almost all originated outside economics,
thus not only importing modes of thinking
often quite [lr removed from the traditional
assumptions of neoclassical economics, but
also reversing a peliod of economic
imperialism when the individual rationality
assumptions of neoclassical economics were
re-applied outside of economics. Gamc
Game
theory comes from mathematics, and chal-
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lengcs
lenges the notion that economic individuals
are isolated from one another by examining
exalllining
their interaction in games. In placc of
value as market pricc, value in game
gamc thcthevaluc
ory is understood in tcrms of sets of alternative payoff~ which dcpend upon how
players anticipate cach other's choices. Noncooperative, one-shot games bcar many
lIIany of
features of the ncoclassical cconomic
economic
the featurcs
view of the individual, but repcated games
and cooperative gamcs introducc a variety
of consideratiollS rcgarding play that make
social structure central. Another new
research
rescarch programmc, behavioural economics, with origillS in psychology, has filCuscd
filCused
on re-examination of neoclassical rational
choice theory.
thcory. Among its results, demonstrated repeatedly in expcrimental studies, is
that economic individuals oftcn cooperate
rather than behavc in a self-interestcd
self-interested
manner. Additionally, individuals' decision-making appears to reflcct heuristic
cognitive bias (lISe of rules of thumb rather
than rigorous analysis) ;lIId
and diffcrcnt kinds
of dccision-fi-aming cflects associated with
emotional
habits, 'herd mentality' and e!l1otional
attachments.
attachmcnts. For example, valuation can bc
be
rcgret
influenced by strong feelings of regret
individuals have
spchavc regarding the loss of specially prized goods. Yet a third ncw research
programlllc,
programme,
evolutionary economics,
including evolutionalY
cvolutionalY game theory, with
origins in Darwinian biology, has !I1ultiple
multiple
currents, some overlapping with game theory and behavioural economics. Here,
investigation first focused on evolutionary
change in economic systcms,
systellls, and value is
modelled as the frequcncy-dcpendent fItness of different survival strategics ill
in populations over time. Subsequent investigation
replaces this biological emphasis with the
beliefs and
idea of cultural evolution of bcliefs
norms, and value is modelled in terms of
the 'fitness' of these belief~ and norms to
promote some generally useful good. Thcsc
new research programmes in maillStream
economics mayor may not converge on
the value thcmes
thcmcs that have characterizcd
characterized
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economic sociology (and heterodox ecoCllrrents
nomics) in the future. While some currents
in recent economics give prominence to
social value concepts, others appear to be
guided more by natural science and formalist ideas. On the whole, however, recent
economics is Ja f.lr more eclectic theoretical
undertaking than neoclassical economics,
particularly as reflected in the former's
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departures from the latter's linked postuullderstood as market price
lates of value understood
individuals understood as isolated
and individuJls
whereas there remain clear
beings. Thus, whereJs
differences between economic sociology and
neoclassical economics regarding the concept of value, whether these differences will
persist between the former and economics
as it emerges in the future remain to be seen.

VALUES See: norms
Ilorms and values
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VEBLEN, THORSTEIN
()2<J) was a hetThorstein Veblen (1 H57-1 ')2<J)
erodox American economist who laid the
intellectual foundations of American institutional economics. The son of Norwegian
immigrants, Veblen studied at Carleton
College, John Hopkins University, Yale
University (where he received :1a PhD in
philosophy) and COrJ]ell
Corlll'll University (where
he did graduate work in economics). In the
course of a chequered
cheCluered academic career, he
held tL'aching
teaching positions at the University
of Chicago (I H<J2-1 <JO(l)
<J()(l) , Stanford Uni<)()(l-<J), the University of Missouri
versity (I <J()(l-<J),
(1<J11-1H) and the New School for Social
(J1 H-2(,). Closely attulled
attuned to intelR.escarch (1 'J1
lectual developll1ents
developmcnts in a broad range of
academic disciplines and national contexts,
Veblen incorporated
inCOlVOr:ltcd i1lto
into his economic
writings concepts and theorics
theories from contemporary rcscarch
research in psychology, cthnolethnol:1S part of a
ogy and the biological sciences, as
effort to bring economics in
determined cffort
step with the widely respected evolutionary
evolutiOl13ry
stcp
sciences of his cra.
era.
Entcring economics when the field was
embroiled in controversies betwcen
between socalled orthodox approaches and challenges
fi'o11l traditions such as the German historical school, Veblen sharpened and elaborated the critique of orthodox classical and
neoclassic:11 economic theory. At the same
ncoclassical
time, he upbraided exponents of the historical school for 'content[ing[ themselves
all enullleration
enul11eration of data [and
[:1nd tliling[ to
with an

